Risk Clustering as a Finance Concept for Rural Electrification in Sub-Saharan Africa to Attract International Private Investors  by Steurer, Elmar et al.
1876-6102 © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of RERIS 2016
doi: 10.1016/j.egypro.2016.07.168 
 Energy Procedia  93 ( 2016 )  183 – 190 
ScienceDirect
Africa-EU Renewable Energy Research and Innovation Symposium, RERIS 2016, 8-10 March 
2016, Tlemcen, Algeria 
Risk Clustering as a finance concept for rural electrification in Sub-
Saharan Africa to attract international private investors 
Elmar Steurera, David Manatsgrubera, Esther Prudence Jouégoa* 
aHochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften Neu-Ulm,University of Applied Sciences, Wileystraße 1, D-89231 Neu-Ulm, Germany 
Abstract 
Projects in the energy sector in Africa suffer from a number of barriers. Especially the combination of political instability and an 
unclear regulatory framework hampers the private sector to realize the investment possibilities in the field of decentralized rural 
electrification. For debt based projects these barriers result in prohibitively high interest rates – roughly 15 % while the return on 
investment does not exceed the low 10% area. This situation leads to strong reluctance from private investors to provide equity. 
A possibility to encourage private investors to step in could be a separation of the different risks, especially separating the typical 
high sovereign risk of a country from the commercial risk of the energy project. As a result, the separated risks can be clearly 
allocated to different investor groups looking for investment opportunities going along with distinct risks. A structured approach 
is proposed through which private international investors are exposed only to the general political risk while international 
development banks cover mainly the regulatory risk. Finally, the newly invented financial instrument convertible grant by the 
electriFI initiative of the EU provides an equity substitute to take over the commercial risk. With this additional financial support, 
decentralized electrification projects in Africa have the possibility to be implemented and the potential to be scaled up.  
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1. Introduction 
For the time being finance is one of the most important bottlenecks for a further extension of renewable energy 
projects in the Sub-Saharan rural electrification field. Typically funding hurdles are given for every part of the 
capital side and for the typical groups of equity and debt provider. There is widespread lack of equity of private 
investors due to a low return / high risk business profile. “Lacking transparency, the risk of retroactive changes to 
the FiT [Feed in Tariff] scheme as well as the creditworthiness of the single off-taker are major barriers for private 
sector investments in renewable energy projects. Compared to other investments in developing countries and even 
investments in fossil fuel power projects, RE [Renewable Energy] projects have a higher exposure due to their 
[initial] capital intensity and resulting high level of fixed costs.” [1]. 
Particularly local debt funding is cumbersome as the lending willingness of local banks is extremely low mainly 
due to their lack of knowledge in energy project finance. “Sub-Saharan Private Lending market is characterized by a 
low level of long term liquidity. As a consequence, local banks and financial regulation institutions limit the 
maximum maturity terms to a few years and interest rates are high due to high local inflation (above 8% in 2012 in 
most of the priority countries) and the lack of adequate guarantees” [2] Generally, banks in Africa have hardly any 
experience in financing small-scale renewable energy projects. The reason of the reluctance of African Banks lies on 
the one hand on the population’s poverty and on the other hand in the fear of unsteady project cash-flow. Another 
reason is that they are not used to finance projects which are only profitable in the medium to long-term [3,4,5]. 
Interest rates in the African banking sector are prohibitively high for long-term investments in the rural 
electrification area, especially as these projects typically show a return on investment in the range of 10 % to 15 % 
(Table 1). In addition, the Sub-Saharan private lending market in the field of renewables is characterized by a low 
level of long-term liquidity necessary for long-term investments in the energy sector. Renewable energy projects 
typically require huge investment costs and a long term horizon for profitability combined with a high risk-profile. 
“With higher capital costs and more complex delivery and O&M requirements, the potential of mini-grids to 
significantly impact the access to energy scenario across the energy poor regions of Asia has not yet been able to be 
realized.” [6] Furthermore the participation of the international private investor base is prohibited due to the 
underlying risk-profile.  
In addition, it is difficult to motivate development finance institutions (DFI) due to the low funding size of 
projects in the rural electrification area. Besides the political risk, the commercial risk is the most important one. It is 
mainly given by the payment risk of the purchaser of electricity, the off-taker [7,8]. Therefore, it has a large 
influence on the profitability of the project. Typically, in the case of African countries, commercial and political 
risks are mixed. A differentiation of these risks would be supportive to attract private investors. “In infrastructure 
financing, private equity investors and lenders are driven by return on investment considerations, which must be 
adequate to compensate them for the risks they assume by making an investment.” [9] Private investors are not risk 
averse in general – they just require distinct sources of risks willing to be exposed and to be compensated by the 
typical prices of the selected risk. 
Table 1: Loan conditions in some Sub-Sahara African Countries. Source: [2]. 
 Longest maturity terms available for loans (Years) Average lending rate (%) 
Kenya 10 14 
Malawi 5 29 
Mozambique 10 19 
Rwanda 10 16 
Tanzania 5 15 
Uganda 20 19 
DRC 3 67 
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 “Equity sponsors may be willing to guarantee commercial risks, such as project development, construction, and 
operation risks, by providing their corporate guarantee to lenders, but they are generally unwilling to take host-
country political risks, thus requiring third-party risk mitigation instruments.” [9] This concept describes a funding 
scheme with the aim of allocating specific types of risk to the corresponding investor groups.  
1.1. The current situation: Developments in Sub-Saharan African funding and treatment of risks  
Recent important developments in Sub-Saharan African finance sector provide a hint how to tackle the 
challenges in funding of renewable energy projects for rural electrification. 
x Concerning the availability of equity, the EU opened the door for equity funding in developing countries to 
support the development of rural electrification by implementing the electriFI initiative [10]. 
x Development finance institutions showed their willingness to support the renewables sector in Africa by the 
foundation of innovative facilities with the possibility to be scaled up. For instance, the GET Fit program of the 
German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) together with Deutsche Bank in Uganda showed that international 
banks are willing to fund project finance in developing countries if the central government is participated and a 
sound credit facility size can be achieved by clustering similar single projects [6,2]. 
x Finally, the willingness to lend of international private investors to Sub-Saharan borrowers improved 
significantly in international capital markets. This underlined by the access of low rated African countries as 
Kenya and Zambia to the international capital markets by issuing large scaled USD bonds in 2014. These 
transactions make clear that the private USD investor base is willing to take over political risk, especially of 
African countries. However, the political risk incorporates solely the country risk of the sovereign body. 
“Institutional investors in developing countries are generally risk-averse and thus typically invest primarily in 
government bonds. In addition, for pension funds in a number of developing countries, the investment in highly 
rated debt is mandated through prudential regulation.” [9]. 
 
The current study proposes a risk clustering concept for rural electrification in Sub-Sahara Africa via a deductive 
and descriptive method of concepts based on capital world data. 
As results it provides a three-level approach taking into account the risk appetite of international bond investors, 
the capability of DFI’s in providing mezzanine loans and the convertible grant mechanism of the EU as a substitute 
of equity. Please be aware that the proposed concept does not mitigate existing risks. The idea is to allocate them to 
different investor groups with different risk appetite. 
2. Methods 
Financial structuring of a project relies on a careful assessment of construction, operating and revenue risks and 
seeks to achieve optimum risk allocation between the private partners to the transaction. In practice, this means 
limiting specific risks to senior lenders and allocating pure commercial risk to equity investors. This is incorporated 
in the risk clustering funding concept. Political and commercial risks are separated with the aim of attracting these 
investor groups willing to take over exclusively the corresponding risks. Figure 1 illustrates the idea. The capital 
side is split into three levels as senior debt (level 1), mezzanine debt (level 2) and equity (level 3). Each level is 
addressed to a specific international investor group and covers this type of risk according to the specific risk appetite 
of each group (Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1: Scheme of the Risk Clustering Concept Method. 
 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Senior debt for political risk coverage 
Level 1 is senior debt and incorporates solely the political risk of the sovereign (Fig. 2). An international USD 
bond issued by a SPV is a constructive approach to attract the international investor base. This is achieved by the 
foundation of a special purpose vehicle (SPV, e. g. “Southern Light”) for political risk coverage. This SPV is in the 
position to issue a bond denominated in USD at international capital markets. The proceeds of the issue of the notes 
were used to fund a local facility agreement based on a loan agreement made between the issuer as lender and the 
corresponding national government through its ministry of finance as borrower. Payments received by the issuer 
under the loan agreement will be used to make payments under the notes. The rating of the SPV is typically a pass-
through of the corresponding government rating. Bondholders are exposed solely to the country risk in terms of 
political risk which they are striving for. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Level 1: Sovereign Risk.  
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The precedent case of Angola via the SPV Northern Light III (1 bln USD in 2012, security code ISIN: 
XS0814512223) for investments in an oil field showed up that a SPV funding vehicle is an effective solution. The 
SPV underlines the indirect project finance character of such a transaction. In addition, the loan to the sovereign 
makes clear that the international investor base is solely exposed to the sovereign risk. 
When it comes to pricing of such an issue the coupon payments depend on the creditworthiness of the country. 
Current capital market conditions as of 30 April 2015 show that the interest rate is in the 7%-area. Figure 3 gives 
rough evidence for that pricing (Source: Thomson Reuters datastream): 
x Sub-Saharan countries are typically BB or B rated. 
x Oil exporting countries as Angola, Gabon and Nigeria are BB rated, however currently under pressure due to the 
drop in oil prices. 
x The interest payment for a B rated 10-year bond as of 30 April 2015 is given by: 
o Interest rate = USD base interest rate 10 years + Credit Spread Rating  
o Interest rate = 2.5%   +  4.5%    =   7.0%   
 
3.2. Mezzanine debt for DFIs 
A loan of a development funding institution (DFI) to the sovereign body accomplishes the bond issuance (Fig. 4). 
The loan is subordinated to the bond issue, leading to additional comfort for the international investor base to take 
over solely the sovereign risk.  The loan is a mezzanine funding instrument incorporating characteristics of equity 
and debt. Mezzanine capital is subordinated to senior debt; in return it contains a profit sharing component in 
addition to a fixed interest payment [11]. As many structures are possible to meet the risk/return expectations of a 
private investor, this funding instrument is suitable to separate political risk of the sovereign to senior debt from 
commercial risk. In addition, a mezzanine capital tier is flexible enough to cover commercial risk. Basically, these 
instruments are suitable for qualified investors as DFIs. As a result, the DFI as lender takes over a combination of 
political risk of sovereign and sub-sovereign bodies. Tentatively, concerning the payment risk of the sub-sovereign, 
the inclusion of partial risk guarantees could be one of the solutions. In addition, the commercial risk is incorporated 
due to the flexibility of interest payment. These additional risks lead to a step-up in the interest rate payment of 
roughly 2.5 % compared to senior debt. 
Fig. 3: Country credit risk rating. Source: Thomson Reuters datastream. 
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Fig. 4: Level 2: Sub-Sovereign Government. 
The total debt proceedings are transferred from the sovereign body to a sub-sovereign governmental institution 
(SSGI) dedicated to the development of rural electrification (Fig. 5). The SSGI has a mandated role in developing 
power infrastructure in rural areas. Loans are extended primarily to rural electrification agencies or rural electric 
cooperatives. The rationale behind implementing the SSGI is to address the minimum required amount of the DFIs 
and local currency issues. DFIs can lend big tickets to a fund. Such a fund would then on-lend to small rural 
projects, which DFIs themselves would never look into. The fund would be fully equipped with standard bankability 
tools and assist in getting business plans right. Tentatively, DFIs could finance the SSGI fund in local currency.  
Interest payments from the sub-sovereign to the sovereign body are used to satisfy the interest payments of the 
international bond issue first. As a result there is enough comfort for international private investors to take over 
solely the country risk. The redemption of debt is facilitated by the depreciation of the assets.  
The SSGI funds are to be held in secure, short-term fixed deposits in the name of SSGI and available to cover 
debt service payment shortfalls. If drawn upon to make annuity payments on bondholders, the state government will 
replenish it through either a government order or by diverting SSGI transfer payment. 
3.3. Equity substitution by a convertible grant 
Equity is given by the convertible grant instrument provided by the EU GPGC electriFI funding initiative (Fig. 
6). In the beginning, the EU grant provides the necessary liquidity for mini-grid operators to invest in long-term 
equipment. A convertible grant is flexible enough to grow with later funding needs. Upon reaching certain 
milestones, the grant will be converted into subordinated debt as a substitute to equity. This should explicitly happen 
when it turns out that the business case is successful. 
Fig. 5: Level 1+2: Transfer fund from the sovereign to the sub-sovereign. 
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Fig. 6: Level 3: Commercial risk exposed to equity/convertible grant. 
This grant should be repaid with no interest at the end of the considered period, using the proceeds of the 
company’s financial returns. A transparent framework has to be established in order to make sure the grant is strictly 
used to finance the inventory and the installation costs at the customer level, but not the company’s operating costs. 
To create motivation, part of the grant may not be repaid if the project achieves results above pre-fixed thresholds. 
On the other hand, the same holds true in case of deficiencies, which have substantial negative effects on the 
business model such as the default of payment of an important customer. 
3.4. Distribution of the funding proceedings to rural electrification projects 
The funding proceeds based on the risk clustering is distributed further from the sub-sovereign to a certain 
number of local mini-grid operators (Fig. 7). This is one of the key tasks of the sub-sovereign governmental 
institution (SSGI). Thus the desired funding scalability is achieved. Assuming the risk clustering funding concept 
leads to a bond issue and mezzanine debt each of 40 mln USD. Equity is delivered as a convertible grant of 20 mln 
USD.  The total capital of 100 mln USD can be used to fund 50 rural electrification projects of 2 mln USD enabling 
the building up a 200 kW photovoltaic site including a mini-grid of roughly 15 km.  
The pooling of the funding needs at the SSGI level is necessary, as there are high transaction costs for local 
governments interested in accessing capital directly from the market, making it affordable for only the central 
government issuers. Pooling arrangements at state levels allow small and medium communities to aggregate their 
financing needs and diversify credit risk which serve to attract investors as well as spread the transactions costs 
among a number of borrowers. Further to assist financial access of small and medium communities in Africa, a 
local-currency 
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Fig. 7: Transfer of fund from the sub-sovereign to several mini-grid operators. 
partial credit guarantee (PCG) program could be devised by multinational development banks as IDA or IFC to 
encourage local banks to lend to a sector that the banks perceive as risky in terms of borrower credit. Guarantees 
could cover up to 50% of local-currency loans originated jointly by local commercial banks.  
4. Conclusion 
The mixture of political and commercial risk is one of the most important barriers preventing the private sector 
from investing in the energy sector of Sub Saharan Africa. This concept introduces an approach to separate these 
risks by allocating the corresponding risks to specific investor groups. The proposed three-level approach takes into 
account the risk appetite of international bond investors, the capability of DFI’s in providing mezzanine loans and 
the convertible grant mechanism of the EU as a substitute of equity. By risk clustering, it should basically be 
possible to implement a scalable funding mechanism for rural electrification purposes without direct subsidies. 
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